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This article specifies a novel theoretical framework to explore how rival ethnic groups learn from threats to ethnic kin in a neighboring country and from threats made by nominal rivals at home. We argue that a combination of external and internal threats causes violence domestically. Violence causes casualties, increases interethnic animosity, and generates refugee flows. These outcomes, in turn, contribute to renewed violence, reinforce or undermine disparities in power, and shape patterns of ethnic domination. Among the range of outcomes generated by our framework are those that bear a strong resemblance to the trajectory of ethnic domination in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad. [Supplemental materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher’s online edition of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics for the following free supplemental resource: an appendix of the framework’s formal aspects and technical details.]

Given the structural similarities of ethnic configurations in both states, it should come as no surprise that perceptions of ethnic crises often tend to transcend national boundaries, thereby paving the way for a displacement of conflict from one setting to another. A kind of perverse dialectic is thus set in motion, whereby ethnic conflicts in one state have significant side effects in the other. René Lemarchand

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Why was a Hutu majority that took control of the state from a dominant Tutsi minority in Rwanda unable to retain power in the long run? And why was a dominant Tutsi minority in neighboring Burundi not dislodged from power by the dominated Hutu majority? The trajectory of ethnic domination in Rwanda and Burundi in the four decades following independence raises a broader set of questions about group dynamics in dyads, two contiguous states, characterized by transnational ethnic ties: How do ethnic groups learn from threats facing ethnic kin in neighboring states and the resultant domestic challenges these give rise to? Why are lessons from past episodes of interethnic violence internalized differently across groups with ostensibly similar characteristics? And, more importantly, how does group learning affect patterns of ethnic domination? This article specifies a novel framework to trace how trajectories of ethnic domination emerge and evolve in dyads characterized by transnational ethnic ties, paying particular attention to the empirical puzzle posed by the Rwanda–Burundi dyad.2

Dyads characterized by transnational ethnic ties are hardly unique to Rwanda and Burundi, and the diffusion of civil wars across national boundaries has been all too common in sub-Saharan Africa. Take the case of the Zaghawa, a transnational ethnic minority group across eastern and northern Chad and its border with Sudan. In Chad, the Zaghawa comprise less than 2% of the population yet they control the presidency, the government, and the army. Across the border in Sudan, despite being among the larger ethnic groups of the Darfur region, they are victimized by the Janjaweed militias.3 Although the patterns of ethnic domination are less straightforward due to the existence of numerous ethnic groups vying for domination, the subnational area of Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) serves as another example of a dyad where civil war has crossed national borders. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the influx of some one million Hutu refugees—primarily military regulars and Interahamwe—further skewed the ethnic composition of the Kivu Region, reigniting decades-old tensions between the Banyamulenge Tutsi minority and neighboring ethnic groups. After Mobutu Sese Seko ordered the expulsion of all Banyamulenge Tutsi and Banyarwanda (Tutsi and Hutu), stripping them of their Congolese citizenship, the Tutsi-led Rwandan government intervened in Kivu, using the intervention to dismantle Hutu refugee camps, to massacre thousands of Hutu believed to be complicit in the genocidal killings, and to establish the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the liberation of Congo (ADFL) with Laurent Kabila at its head.4 In Mozambique, despite the near majority status of the northern concentrated Macua-Lowme ethnic group (47% of the population), the smaller, southern-based Tsonga (23% of the population) dominated politics.5 During the civil war (1975–94), regional differences arguably held more political relevance than ethnic distinctions6
and the fighting was driven by external influences that played upon internal grievances. As accusations of southern favoritism sparked infighting within the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo), the Rhodesian, and later South African governments organized and financed the opposition RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) insurgency. In addition, the diffusion of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks from Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan into the DRC and the Central African Republic further highlight the potential for civil conflicts to spread across international borders when transnational ethnic kin (the Acholi) exist. Despite advances in the literature on the diffusion of civil war, existing theoretical approaches have shied away from analyzing the microdrivers of conflict (see note 11 for prominent exceptions). As a result, most extant theoretical accounts “cannot explain why or how civil wars spread across neighboring countries.”

This article adds to research on transnational ethnic ties and to the rich repertoire of case-specific literature on Rwanda and Burundi. Our framework explicitly specifies a set of initial conditions and mechanisms to explain how the diffusion of conflict across national borders contributes to ethnic domination—our dependent variable. As such, we articulate how rival ethnic groups in one country learn from threats to ethnic kin in a neighboring country and at home; the process by which distinct trajectories of ethnic domination emerge and evolve over time in dyads with transnational ethnic ties. With respect to initial conditions, we argue that two factors instrumentally shape patterns of ethnic domination: (a) initial disparities in group advantage—the past domestic advantage a group enjoys vis-à-vis nominal rivals as well as the relative domestic advantage of ethnic kin abroad; and (b) group size—whether a group constitutes a majority or minority at home, as well as the associated status of ethnic kin abroad. With respect to mechanisms, we argue that: (a) internal threats, magnified by the perception of declining asymmetries in power as a result of changes in group advantage, cause violence domestically; (b) violence and the resulting casualties then increase interethnic animosity and generate massive refugee flows; (c) refugee flows heighten ethnic animosity in the neighboring state by lending support to extremist domestic agendas and tipping the ethnic composition of border localities; and (d) increased internal threat levels in the neighboring state serve to reinforce or undermine disparities in power based on group size or group advantage and heighten the salience of external threats for ethnic kin across the border. A combined focus on these initial conditions and mechanisms illustrates how conflict spills across national borders. This combined focus also reveals cyclical patterns of ethnic antagonism and violence that contribute to patterns of domination in dyads characterized by transnational ethnic ties.

Our framework, used to explain the trajectory of ethnic domination in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad, suggests that (a) where group size and initial
strength are equivalent, no clear pattern of domination exists; (b) a critical initial advantage (economic, political, or military) is necessary for members of an ethnic minority to dominate members of the majority group; (c) the likelihood of minority rule in both neighboring countries will be considerably lower if the minority group enjoys an initial advantage in a single country; and (d) group animosity is not constant, but cyclical, and likely to be higher under minority rule given the proclivity of both the minority and majority group members to be more intolerant and threatened under these conditions.

Section 2 briefly considers how ethnic rivals and ethnic kin learned from repeated bouts of tension and violence in Rwanda and Burundi. Drawing upon the rich secondary source literature on the Rwanda and Burundi dyad, we construct the building blocks of our theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the framework itself, with technical details relegated to the appendix. Our analysis in Section 4 focuses on findings that bear a close resemblance to the trajectories of domination in Rwanda and Burundi. Section 5 discusses the relevance of our findings both for the future of Rwanda and Burundi, and the more general case of other dyads with transnational ethnic ties.

LEARNING FROM ADVERSITY IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

Both Rwanda and Burundi have been too small, too remote, and too insignificant to feature prominently in the strategic calculus of powerful states. Left to their own devices, these countries have repeatedly experienced violence on a scale that draws international condemnation, but no consequential intervention. Despite this disregard, there is much that these two Central African states can teach us—even more so given their relative isolation from great power rivalry—about how ethnic groups learn from threats to ethnic kin in neighboring states, from threats made by nominal rivals at home, and how these lessons are internalized differently across groups resulting in distinct trajectories of ethnic domination.

In both Rwanda and Burundi, a Hutu majority—roughly 85% of the population—was pitted against a Tutsi minority—roughly 14% of the population—yielding divergent outcomes. In Rwanda, the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown in a revolution preceding independence, leading to majority rule for 32 years. Whereas in Burundi, the Tutsi minority attained power in the years following independence and consolidated its control of the state shortly thereafter. As a result, Rwanda presaged a grievous fate for Burundi’s Tutsi—life under the tyranny of Hutu majority rule—while Burundi effectively developed into a counterfactual for Rwanda’s Hutu—life under the tyranny of Tutsi minority rule. This precarious, if asymmetric, balance was altered by events in 1994 when the Tutsi minority regained control of Rwanda, leading for the first time to minority rule in both countries.
Figure 1 provides a period-wise depiction of ethnic domination in Rwanda and Burundi. Prior to 1959, Belgian colonialists relied on the Tutsi monarchy to enforce their policies and to collect taxes in Rwanda, as a result, the Tutsi dominated the Hutu (indicated by the vertical black arrow from T~M to H in the first cell under Rwanda in Figure 1). In Burundi, on the other hand, there was considerable infighting within the monarchy prior to 1959, yet the monarchy still dominated both the Hutu and Tutsi (this relationship is represented in the first cell under Burundi in Figure 1: The horizontal arrow connecting M’ and M’ indicates the infighting within the monarchy, while the vertical arrows from M’ to T’ and H’ depict the monarchy’s dominance over both the Hutu and the Tutsi). In Rwanda, monarchical rule came to a close with Hutu majority dominance from 1959 to 1965. During the same period in Burundi, the monarchy remained politically influential but less dominant since power was contested by all three actors (as indicated by the bidirectional arrows connecting the monarchy, the Tutsi, and the Hutu). While the Hutu majority maintained its dominance over the Tutsi minority in Rwanda from 1965 to 1994, the Tutsi minority dominated the Hutu majority in Burundi during this period. Finally, from 1994–2003, Tutsi minorities in both countries dominated their Hutu rivals.
External Threats
Underlying the patterns of ethnic domination in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad are a series of interconnected events labeled *external threats*. In Rwanda, the manifestly ethnic sentiments echoed during the Hutu Revolution contributed, in no small measure, to state capture along ethnic lines in Burundi.\(^\text{13}\) Whereas the Hutu uprisings in Burundi in 1988, 1991, and 1995 and their subsequent suppression by Burundi’s (Tutsi-led) military, together with the assassination of popularly elected (Hutu) President Ndadaye by pro-Tutsi paratroopers in 1993, all had decisive effects in Rwanda.\(^\text{14}\)

Internal Threats
The progression of events within a state—referred to as *internal threats*—were dictated by cycles of interethnic violence and cooperation and had a major bearing on group learning. In Rwanda, Hutu animosity heightened in 1963–64 and once again in 1990 with the move to multiparty politics.\(^\text{15}\) During these periods of political turmoil, Hutu extremists perceived an imminent loss of political power and the scale of violence directed at Tutsi and moderate Hutu increased at a shocking pace, culminating in genocide. In Burundi, violence was similarly tied to internal threats. Any shift in power away from the ruling Tutsi minority was followed by episodes of violence: the Hutu rebellion in 1965, an abortive coup attempt in 1972, political concessions to Hutu by Buyoya in 1987, and national elections in 1993.\(^\text{16}\)

Refugee Flows
In both Rwanda and Burundi, episodes of violence generated massive *refugee flows*, which in turn fueled ethnic animosity, either directly by instigating local and transnational violence, or indirectly by lending support to extremist domestic agendas. During the early years of Hutu domination in Rwanda, Tutsi crossed the country’s borders into Burundi in considerable numbers, developing an appreciable yearning for Tutsi rule.\(^\text{17}\) In contrast, larger and more frequent waves of Hutu refugees fled to Rwanda from Burundi.\(^\text{18}\) Common to both sets of displaced communities was the use of the host country—Rwanda for Hutu and Burundi for uprooted Tutsi—to attack border communities in their home countries. Lessons from the progression of external threats, internal threats, refugee flows, and violence—summarized in Table 1—were shaped by two additional factors discussed below: *group advantage* and *group size*.

Group Advantage
In Rwandan society, the colonial institutionalization of Tutsi rule led to greater social polarization, notably on the basis of ethnicity.\(^\text{19}\) In 1959, 43
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Violence and Refugee Flows</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Hutu Revolution begins</td>
<td>Localized anti-Tutsi violence➔ Tutsi flee to Burundi</td>
<td>Prince Rwagasore assassinated by Tutsi hardliners</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Parmehutu wins legislative elections; overthrow of Tutsi Monarchy; Rwanda proclaimed a Republic</td>
<td>⇐ Incipient resistance to Hutu rule Majority (Hutu) rule established in Rwanda➔ 20,000 Tutsi killed➔ 300,000 Tutsi refugees to Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania between 1959–64➔</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Kayibanda (Hutu) becomes President of Independent Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi separated from Ruanda-Urundi; given independence as a monarchy under Mwambutsa IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Rebel incursion from Burundi</td>
<td>⇐ Hutu refugees to Rwanda More Tutsi killed➔</td>
<td>Localized violence in and around capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>⇐ Hutu Prime Minister killed ⇐ Minority rule (Tutsi) established in Burundi ⇐ 5,000 Hutu massacred in Muramvya ⇐ Intra-Tutsi Hima (Bururi) v. Banyaruguru (Muramvya) competition; rise of Bururi Faction</td>
<td>Assassination of Ngemdadumwe (PM); abortive Hutu coup; army and parties purged of Hutu leadership; monarchy restored Ntare (<em>mwami</em>); Ntare ousted in coup; declaration of 1st Republic with Micombero as PM</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>⇐ 100,000–200,000 Hutu killed nationally ⇐ 200,000 Hutu refugees flee to Tanzania &amp; Rwanda</td>
<td>Ntare killed by Tutsi officers; anti-Tutsi violence in Nyanza Lac, Rumonge, Cankuzo, and Bujumbura; support of Hutu rebels from Tanzania and Mulelists from Zaire; army reprisals result in genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Habyarimana (hardliner) overthrows Kayibanda in coup; 2nd Republic proclaimed</td>
<td>Rise of northerners and Bashiro faction➔</td>
<td>(Continued on next page)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Violence and Refugee Flows</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976–87</td>
<td>Civilian rule under one party governance established (1978)</td>
<td>← Power remains with Tutsi</td>
<td>Bagaza overthrows Micomero in coup; 2nd Republic proclaimed; references to ethnicity banned</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>← Absence of ethnic violence</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Bans MDR-P, establishes MRND</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>← Power remains with Tutsi (Hima from Bururi)</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>← 20,000 Hutu killed in the two communes</td>
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<td>← Power remains with Tutsi (Hima from Bururi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion begins</td>
<td>“Practice massacres” of Tutsi</td>
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<td>Tutsi refugees 1 million Hutu internally displaced by RPF</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>← 300,000 Hutu refugees to Tanzania and Zaire</td>
<td>Huto rebels attack; army retaliates</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Cease-fire with RPF; Tutsi rebels to be part of national army and share key government posts</td>
<td>← 1 million Hutu internally displaced</td>
<td>Assassination of President Nadadye (Huto) by pro-Bagaza troops; Hutu militias and FRODEBU members kill Tutsi nationally with genocidal intent; army reprisals; civil war begins</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>← Thousands of Tutsi killed</td>
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<td>← 50,000–100,000 Hutu killed</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Habyarimana killed, hardliners led by Bagosora take control, genocide ensues; RPF invasion resumes, resulting in capture of Kigali, ouster of Hutu regime</td>
<td>← Sporadic violence continues</td>
<td>President Ntaryamira (Huto) killed; Ntibantunganya (Huto) becomes president; civil war continues and weakens regime</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>500,000–800,000 Tutsi killed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 million Hutu flee to Zaire and Tanzania</td>
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<td>Camps fall under extremist control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>Effect on Private Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>500–1,000 Hutu killed in capital</td>
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<td>30,000 Hutu refugees to DRC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>700,000 Hutu internally resettled</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.2 million Hutu refugees return to Rwanda</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tanzania expels 500,000 Hutu refugees</td>
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<td>UPRONA consolidates grip on power</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Rwandan troops attack refugee camps in DRC to drive home Hutu refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Buyoya deposes Ntibantunganya; suspends constitution; military moves Hutu to regroupment camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Government and FRODEBU reach power-sharing agreement; interim constitution legalizes Buyoya's rule; constitution revived and parliament enlarged</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>President Bizimungu (Hutu) resigns;</td>
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<td>Kagame (Tutsi) elected President</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>New flag and anthem unveiled to promote national unity; <strong>gacaca</strong> courts formed to try perpetrators of genocide</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Bizimungu arrested</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Buyoya begins 18-month term as part of 3-year power-sharing agreement</td>
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<td>Hutu rebels and government sign cease fire; rebels to be part of new national army</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ndayizanye (Hutu) succeeds Buyoya as President under 3-year power-sharing agreement; Tutsi military effectively controls state and civilian government</td>
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</table>

*Note. The arrows (↔, →) indicate the effect of events in one country on the other.*
of 45 chiefs and 549 of 559 subchiefs were Tutsi. Yet, by 1960, incidents of mass violence perpetrated by the Hutu majority against Rwanda’s minority Tutsi population increased as a result of mounting discontent. In reaction to the extant “Hutu Revolution,” the Tutsi elite—much to the chagrin of their Belgian patrons—attempted to gain the support of communist regimes in a bid to retain power. The move backfired, with the Belgians replacing Tutsi with Hutu chiefs and dividing the country into 229 communes headed, rather tellingly, by 210 Hutu and 19 Tutsi burgomasters.

A similar outcome in Burundi was somewhat less probable, given lower levels of social polarization marked by the absence of clear Hutu or Tutsi domination. In contrast to Rwanda, the ganwa, a princely ruling class comprised of both Tutsi and Hutu aristocrats, dominated Burundi’s social hierarchy. Beneath the ganwa lay ordinary Tutsi and Hutu, with the pigmoid twa ranked lower still. At independence, Burundi became a constitutional monarchy with far less prominence attached to ethnicity, relative to Rwanda. As a result, Belgian intervention in Burundi focused primarily on the Batare and Bezi lineages within the ganwa. Of the 130 chiefs in 1929, only 30 were Tutsi and only 27 were Hutu, with the majority being Batare (41) and Bezi (35).

Whereas the Belgians backed the Batare, resentment to their policies resulted in overwhelming support for the Bezi, ultimately leading to the election of Prince Rwagasore and his Parti de l’Union et du Progrès National (Uprona) in the September 1961 legislative elections. Rwagasore, a Tutsi prince, was married to a Hutu and had succeeded in consolidating Hutu and Tutsi support both generally and within his party. With Belgian and Bezi complicity, Rwagasore was assassinated on 13 October 1961. In the ensuing competition for power, tension between Hutu and Tutsi grew, with members of the Tutsi minority seizing state control to preclude the fate of their ethnic kin in Rwanda. Thus, in a notable deviation from the country’s preindependence power structure, by 1964, 83 of 133 high-ranking civil service posts were staffed by Tutsis in Burundi, whereas only 43 were staffed by Hutu.

Colonial policy therefore played an instrumental role in fomenting ethnic divisions—whether directly or indirectly—in both Rwanda and Burundi. As such, the group advantage historically enjoyed by the Tutsi diminished in Rwanda, by virtue of Belgian maneuvering, resulting in state capture by the Hutu majority. In Burundi, the demonstration effects of majority rule in Rwanda, together with a series of political and military “mishaps”—Belgian support notwithstanding—tipped the advantage in favor of Tutsi elites, leading to state capture by the minority.

Group Size
To add to the asymmetry of outcomes, while group size initially favored the Hutu majority in Rwanda, it paradoxically worked against the Hutu majority
Greater threat perception on the part of Burundi’s Tutsi minority, more specifically the Tutsi-Hima of the Bururi region, keenly influenced the initial drive to capture the state as well as the rapid consolidation of minority rule. Between 1966 and 1993 all three military leaders—Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya—were Tutsi-Hima from the Bururi region and were born within two miles of one another.33 In Burundi, threat perception led the minority regime to consolidate power in a concerted effort to withstand internal or external challenges—a lesson that appears to have been lost on Rwanda’s majority-dominated regime.34

Compared to Rwanda, domination by Burundi’s minority resulted in a more restive dominated majority and a more insecure dominant minority, as evidenced by more frequent rebellions followed, rather predictably, by more severe repression.35 The Hutu regime in Rwanda, on the other hand, which tacitly permitted Tutsi participation in political, economic, and social activity, was more prominently marred by internal strife.36 Indeed, Prunier notes that in 1994, “the Rwandan political system was on the verge of collapse and any strong push from outside would complete the process.”37 This stood in marked contrast to the minority-led regime in Burundi, characterized by an iron-fisted grip on power. So much so that the Tutsi-led regime periodically experimented with power-sharing arrangements, fully confident that the country’s Tutsi-dominated militarily could and, more appreciably, would intervene to reestablish minority rule.38

The series of interconnected events described above serve as the building blocks of our framework. Specifically, we argue that internal threats, magnified by growing equivalence in the relative power of rival groups, cause violence domestically, resulting in casualties that increase interethnic animosity and generate massive refugee flows. Refugee flows, in turn, serve to heighten ethnic animosity in the neighboring state by lending support to extremist domestic agendas and tipping the ethnic composition in border localities in which refugees typically settle. Increased internal threat levels in the neighboring state then serve to reinforce or undermine disparities in power based on group size or group advantage and heighten the salience of external threats for ethnic kin across the border. A combined focus on group size and group advantage, together with the mechanisms outlined above, illustrates how conflict spills across national borders. Taken together, these factors explain patterns of ethnic domination in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad in the period from 1963 to 2003.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Our framework serves as a heuristic device that allows us to explore further the empirical puzzle that motivates this article: the inability of the majority to retain power in Rwanda or to attain power in Burundi. While we suspect
that the patterns of ethnic domination may be different in more ethnically diverse societies, we have chosen to specifically match the situation in Rwanda and Burundi. We acknowledge that the demographic characteristics of the Rwanda–Burundi dyad (including the existence of two ethnic groups with a 85% to 15% demographic split) are rare in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, we ran four experiments with a variety of initial conditions to test our intuition about the mechanisms that generate various patterns of ethnic domination in contiguous states. In the first experiment, which serves largely as a control case, the proportion of ethnic groups is equal in each country. The second experiment is distinguished by rival majorities, such that Group \( a \) is a majority (85% of the population) in Country 1 and a minority (15% of the population) in Country 2. In the third and fourth experiments, Group \( a \) enjoys majority status in both countries with the proportion of \( a \) increasing from 70% in Experiment 3 to 85% in Experiment 4. We focus on the experiment that most closely reflects the Rwanda–Burundi dyad in this article and relegate the formal aspects of our framework along with the results of the experiments with different population parameters to the appendix. We provide a “nontechnical” description of our framework below.

Group Characteristics

We begin by specifying a population comprised of rival ethnic Groups \( a \) and \( b \). Two neighboring Countries 1 and 2 of equal size contain members of both ethnic groups. Each group is characterized by an initial level of ethnic animosity and an initial level of aggregate strength. Animosity serves as a threshold for violence or flight, while strength provides a measure of group power or advantage.

Ethnic Domination

Given the existence of distinct ethnic groups, we compute measures of aggregate strength to determine which group dominates in each country: If the strength of Group \( a \) is greater than the strength of Group \( b \) in a country, then Group \( a \) dominates Group \( b \).

Domestic and External Threats

Each group faces a combination of domestic and external threats. Domestic threats capture challenges to a group from within the state, whereas external threats capture challenges to a group resulting from the persecution of ethnic kin in a neighboring state. A group is therefore threatened if the competing
group is close in strength at home, or if one’s own group is persecuted abroad.

In Country $I$, for instance, as the difference in group strength decreases, the threat to both groups at home increases. In a similar vein, as the proportion of ethnic kin attacked in Country $2$ increases, the external threat to the kin group in Country $I$ increases. As a result, we assume that threats are group and country specific, and our framework places equal weight on domestic and external threats. In sum, a combination of internal and external threats cause violence domestically, generating casualties, an increase in ethnic animosity, and renewed violence.

Violence and Animosity

Violence results in casualties and increases the animosity of victims in one of two ways: (a) as a direct response to a recent episode of violence; or (b) as a latent response to a major episode that forms part of a group’s collective consciousness. Violence also creates refugees whose presence both agitates interethnic tension in the host state and supports, whether directly or indirectly, challenges to the rival regime at home. The increased flow of refugees then leads to more violence and casualties further heightening ethnic animosity. Intuitively, our framework will demonstrate that increased ethnic animosity and violence are more likely under minority rather than majority rule as both groups are likely to be less tolerant and more fearful of one another.

Individual Behavior

Figure 2 demonstrates the ways in which members of dominant and dominated ethnic groups react to a combination of internal and external threats,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Animosity</th>
<th>High Animosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Threat</td>
<td>High Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant: Status Quo</td>
<td>Dominant: Status Quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominated: Status Quo</td>
<td>Dominated: Status Quo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2** Behavior as a function of threat and animosity. *Note.* The expected behavior of members from the dominant and dominated ethnic groups are specified under four possible combinations of threat and animosity above.
based on their level of animosity. If animosity is low, individuals are unlikely to engage in violence or flight in response to any level of threat, based on the presumption low animosity fails to evoke any reaction on the part of group members. In contrast, during periods of heightened animosity, even minor threats result in violence or flight, given that group relations have broken down and any threat is sufficient to generate a strong reaction on the part of group members.

Updating: Animosity and Strength

In our framework, an individual’s animosity for rivals is updated as a lagged weighted average of the most significant and most recent threat experienced by the group in the model. For members of Group $a$ in Country 1, ethnic animosity can increase or decrease over time depending on the severity of threats.

An individual’s strength is updated in two ways. During periods of contention, it is not uncommon for state control to alternate between rivals, until one group is able to assert its power over the other. When the difference in aggregate group strength is narrow, the group that gains from state control (in each country)—the advantaged group—is determined randomly at each step since no group clearly dominates the other. Otherwise, the advantaged group is simply the dominant group—the group whose aggregate strength exceeds that of its rival. In contrast, the strength of every member of the disadvantaged group, now Group $b$ in Country 1, decreases by a constant each step, with probability proportional to the number of members of $a$ who engaged in violence against members of $b$. Finally, as the population of refugees grows, the regime at home is likely to face greater external challenges to its rule.

Sequence of Events

Activity begins in Country 1. For the purpose of discussion, assume that Group $a$ is found to dominate $b$. Members of $a$ and $b$ calculate their respective threat levels and the former engage in violence (or refrain) while the latter flee (or stay put). Individual strength and animosity are updated (as specified). Activity then shifts to Country 2. Assume that Group $b$ dominates $a$ in Country 2. Members of $a$ and $b$ in Country 2 calculate their respective threat levels and the latter engage in violence (or refrain) while the former flee (or stay put). Individual strength and animosity are then updated in Country 2, and the aggregate strength of Groups $a$ and $b$ is compared to determine the dominant group. The time step ends and play continues as specified in the next time step.
The Rwanda–Burundi Experiment

We set the initial conditions in our framework to approximate those in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad, such that Group $a$ is a dominant majority (85% of the population) in Country 1 and Group $b$ is a dominant minority (15% of the population) in Country 2 ($a$ being the dominated majority in Country 2, and $b$ the dominated minority in Country 1). As discussed above, ethnic animosity and strength vary as a function of internal and external factors, and initial disparities in group strength and group size further reinforce or undermine disparities in power, shaping patterns of ethnic domination. Moreover, we assume that in order for a minority to dominate a numerically superior majority, it must have started with a critical initial advantage (economic, political, or military) over the majority.

Exogenous Factors, Weighting, and Endogeneity

We readily concede that our model does not include an exhaustive set of factors that impact patterns of ethnic domination. As such, a number of critically important aspects and specific historical events unique to Rwanda and Burundi have been excluded from our analysis. For example, we acknowledge that the switch from Hutu majority rule to Tutsi minority rule in 1994 was strongly influenced by both the pressure to democratize and the Arusha peace process. Due to radical changes in Ugandan domestic politics, the exiled Tutsi community was no longer as welcome there. This loss of a relative safe haven for Tutsi in Uganda also impacted patterns of domination in Rwanda. Moreover, we do not include intraethnic animosity within the Tutsi or Hutu in our model. Finally, we acknowledge potential endogeneity issues pertaining to the role of animosity as a cause or effect of ethnic domination. On the one hand, we view animosity as magnifying or reducing the salience of a threat. On the other hand, we acknowledge that the level of ethnic animosity increases with each threat.

Thus, while we recognize the importance of these additional factors and events, we have chosen to focus on the impact of transnational ties and refugee flows on patterns of ethnic domination, operationalized as a dynamic and fluid process.

RESULTS

Our theoretical framework is formalized with the aid of a computational model, and we report the results of our formal analysis in the appendix. In the paragraphs that follow, we focus on the model experiment that resembles the Rwanda–Burundi dyad. Country 1 in Figure 3 approximates the situation...
in Rwanda where the majority Hutu ($a_1$) initially dominated the minority Tutsi ($b_1$), whereas Country 2 approximates the situation in Burundi where the relative power of the majority Hutu ($a_2$) and the minority Tutsi ($b_2$) was largely equivalent, with the minority ($b_2$) rapidly gaining dominance over the majority ($a_2$).

Trajectories of Minority Domination in Rwanda and Burundi

In Country 2 (see plot [a], Figure 3), no clear pattern of domination exists until Event 100, after which the minority Group $b$ begins to dominate and consolidate its advantage over the majority Group $a$. In contrast, the majority Group $a$ in Country 1 initially dominates the Minority $b$, with the threat posed by the latter growing steadily until Event 700. At this time, the minority challenges the majority and effectively begins to dominate, resulting in minority rule in Countries 1 and 2. Thus whereas Group $b$'s initial advantage in aggregate strength leads to minority rule in Country 2 early in the run, the narrower advantage in $b$'s aggregate strength in Country 1 only materializes much later, as in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad.

These results suggest that key mechanisms of our framework—threats, the resultant animosity, violence, and flight mediated by group size and initial group advantage—effectively capture the sequence of minority domination in the Rwanda–Burundi dyad. This shows that there is more to our framework than a simple deterministic relationship between aggregate strength and ethnic domination.
Variation in Aggregate Animosity

A common presumption is that ethnic animosity between Hutu and Tutsi has always been high. This presumption overlooks the fact that animosity varies both within groups and over time. Thus, animosity alone appears insufficient to generate violence between groups. For instance, Hutu animosity in Rwanda—linked to threat perceptions—heightened in 1963–64 after Tutsi commandos attempted to retake parts of the country and capital city, and once again with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion in 1990.42 In the interim, however, intergroup relations were marked by greater cooperation—what Prunier refers to as the “good years” under Habyarimana.43 Likewise, under the Micombero regime in Burundi anti-Hutu discrimination and violence peaked, whereas under Bagaza’s Second Republic references to ethnic identity were forbidden and animosity (and violence) remained low.44

In Figure 3, plot (b) depicts changes in the aggregate level of group animosity in each country over the same run of the model. The second plot indicates that group animosity is clearly not constant during the struggle for domination, with notable peaks in the aggregate animosity of Group a (Events 20, 100, 250, 300, 450, 650, 800–1,000) and b (Events 20, 350, 550, 800–1,000) in Country 1, and peaks in aggregate animosity of Group a (Events 200, 300, 400, 600, 950) and Group b (Events 150, 300, 500, 900) in Country 2. In the interim, animosity returns to a baseline level for each group, reflecting the variation in interethnic tension characteristic of Rwanda and Burundi.

Underlying these dynamics are changes in group animosity driven by domestic and external events. Groups that experience violence become more antagonistic and in turn become more likely to react to threats, perpetrating violence when the balance of power is in their favor. As groups struggle to establish control over the state and violence is perpetrated by both sides, animosity reaches its peak. Note that the peaks in the aggregate animosity of both groups in Country 2 occur relatively early in the run, close to the point at which Group b begins to dominate a. After this point, there is less variation in animosity as domination by b becomes progressively more entrenched.45 In Country 1, the pattern is reversed. Animosity cycles, albeit with far less variation, until late in the run. By Event 700, both groups begin to display increasing animosity (and little or no cycling) as the transition from majority to minority domination begins. Note also that prior to this point, the variation in animosity occurs at a much higher baseline in Country 2 than it does in Country 1.

The variation in group animosity depicted in Figure 3 occurs in other runs of the model as well, albeit with volatility or consistency that reflects the level of threats, ensuing violence, and patterns of domination particular to each model variant.
FIGURE 4 The uncertain future of minority domination. Note. In this run of the model, 100 agents interacted (in each country) over a period of 3,000 time steps; $\alpha_{a,1}$ and $\alpha_{a,2}$ equal .85; the initial pattern of domination is given by $(b_1, b_2)$; default values for all other the parameters remain unchanged.

Extending Framework Duration

Figure 4 extends the duration of the model beyond the period analyzed in the article (that is, post-2003) to depict the trajectory of minority domination by $b_1$ in Country 1 and $b_2$ in Country 2, with the caveat that this exercise is not offered as a prediction, albeit post-facto, of any sort.46

While the actual future of each country was far from predictable, extending the model duration of our framework suggests that minority rule would be consolidated in both countries, with some interesting implications. Arguably, the Tutsi enjoyed an initial advantage over the Hutu in both Rwanda and Burundi after a history of princely rule reinforced by ethnocentric colonial policy, with this advantage contracting in Rwanda and expanding in Burundi. The counterfactual derived from the model suggests that had the Tutsi enjoyed an initial advantage in Rwanda or Burundi alone, the likelihood of subsequent Tutsi rule in both Rwanda and Burundi would be considerably lower.

In actuality, relations between the Tutsi-dominated regimes in recent years have been characterized by little cooperation. The regime in Burundi has harbored a strong distrust of Rwanda’s regional ambitions, due in large part to the latter’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under the premise of attacking Hutu rebels and has remained embittered about Rwanda’s earlier support for sanctions against it.47
Under RPF rule in Rwanda, the existence of separate ethnic identities is officially denied, and “denying their non-existence involves severe penal sanctions.” Reyntjens’s analysis of the RPF growing stranglehold on power supports the premise that continued interethnic cooperation in Rwanda seems unlikely in the long term. Reyntjens asserts that “rather than liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, the RPF has brought oppression, exclusion and dictatorship” that has fermented “widespread and deep-rooted feelings of frustration, anger and despair” creating a “fertile breeding ground for structural violence, and they are likely to again lead to violence.” However tenuous over the long term, the RPF regime has managed to maintain stability and Rwanda was admitted to the Commonwealth in November 2009, only the second country after Mozambique to become a member with no constitutional ties to the United Kingdom or without a British colonial past.

In stark contrast to Rwanda, Burundi “explicitly recognizes ethnic differences as a necessary condition to reconcile minority rights with the claims of the majority,” and has institutionalized these differences through a balance between Tutsi and Hutu within all branches of government. With the protection of a UN peacekeeping force to maintain security during the elections, voters overwhelmingly backed a referendum approving the power-sharing constitution in March 2005. Later that year, Pierre Nkurunziza of the Hutu dominated Forces for Defense and Democracy (FDD) party was elected president. After years of protracted negotiations and fighting, Burundi’s last remaining rebel group, the Force for National Liberation (FNL), laid down arms and officially became a political party in 2009. In the same month, ex-rebel Godefroid Niyombare was appointed the first ever Hutu Chief of General Army Staff in Burundi. While these recent developments may be cause for cautious optimism, without intense and sustained regional and international pressure it is unlikely that the warring factions in Burundi would have arrived at a homegrown solution. Despite these recent reforms, the Tutsi still dominate the military and “Burundi also has the highest rate in Africa of heads of state and of government officials to be sent to their graves by an assassin’s bullet.” If the past is any indication, future elections could serve as a catalyst for violence, setting the cycle of rebellion and repression in motion once again in Burundi and, by implication, in neighboring Rwanda.

CONCLUSION

This article introduces a novel framework to explore how rival ethnic groups in one country learn from events affecting ethnic kin in a neighboring country, and the resultant domestic challenges these transnational events give rise to. We argue that internal threats, magnified by a narrowing differential in the power of rival groups, cause violence domestically, resulting in casualties
that increase interethnic animosity and generate massive refugee flows. Refugee flows, in turn, heighten ethnic animosity in the neighboring state by lending support to extremist domestic agendas and by tipping the ethnic composition of select localities. Increased internal threat levels in the neighboring state reinforce or undermine disparities in power based on group size or group advantage and heighten the salience of external threats for ethnic kin across the border. A combined focus on group size and group advantage, together with the mechanisms outlined above, documents one process by which conflict spills across national borders. The framework presented in this article deepens our understanding of particular patterns of ethnic domination. The analogue to our case, the Rwanda–Burundi dyad, is evident.

Given the initial, albeit asymmetric, advantage enjoyed by the Tutsi and the disparity in the relative size of rival groups in both countries, lessons from consequential external and internal threats were internalized differently, ultimately constraining the ability of the Hutu majority to attain power in Burundi or to retain power in Rwanda, and leading to the eventual capture of the state by the Tutsi minorities in both countries.

While the advantage historically enjoyed by the Tutsi diminished in Rwanda, resulting in state capture by the majority, this advantage expanded and tipped events in favor of the Tutsi in Burundi leading to state capture by the minority. The ensuing sequence of events was significant, given that Burundi's minority monitored the inauguration of majority rule in neighboring Rwanda with considerable trepidation and acted swiftly to preclude a similar fate at home. They were abetted in their efforts by the presence of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, who had a decisive interest in promoting Tutsi rule in Burundi. Both regimes then set about consolidating power, with Burundi's Tutsi minority effectively eliminating any Hutu threat—political, military, or economic—for over a decade following the genocide in 1972. Whereas both regimes openly discriminated against the groups they dominated, the extent of ethnic domination in Rwanda was considerably weaker than that in Burundi. And whereas both countries experienced heavy refugee flows—both outbound and inbound population movements—the geographical concentration and political unity of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda played a vital role in their successful return to Rwanda in 1994 under the RPF banner. Indeed, it would appear that the historical advantage enjoyed by Rwandan Tutsi, which failed to influence the initial contest for state capture, was manifest much later in the success of the RPF. The fact that the Hutu government in Rwanda was on its last legs facilitated this task, whereas the consolidation of Tutsi hegemony in Burundi precluded a similar challenge by the geographically dispersed and politically fractured Hutu refugee population.

Among the outcomes generated by our theoretical framework, by varying the size and initial advantage of rival groups, are those that bear a strong
resemblance to the trajectories of ethnic domination in Rwanda and Burundi. Results from our analysis indicate that despite the initial failure of the minority to capitalize on their dwindling historical advantage in Country 1, the fact that the minority did capitalize on a growing and more recent advantage in Country 2 was consequential. An initial advantage in aggregate group strength may therefore be necessary but not sufficient for minority domination, given that the Tutsi were arguably the more “advantaged” group in preindependence Rwanda, yet failed to capture the state. Thus, if only one minority group in a dyad enjoys an initial advantage in aggregate strength, then the likelihood that it will dominate the rival majority in its home state is closely tied to its population share. Had the Tutsi enjoyed an initial advantage in Rwanda or Burundi alone, the likelihood of subsequent Tutsi rule in both Rwanda and Burundi is likely to have been considerably lower. A general implication is that for members of an ethnic minority to dominate members of the majority group, a critical initial advantage—most commonly economic, political, or military—is a necessary though not sufficient condition, whereas the conditions for majority dominance are arguably less stringent given numerical superiority.

Our theoretical framework also reveals that underlying patterns of group animosity in dyads characterized by transnational ethnic ties are cyclical. Not only do these patterns bear a close resemblance to those observed in Rwanda and Burundi, but they also support the notion that the level of interethnic tension is likely to be higher under minority than majority rule. Londregan et al. rightly note that minorities use military rule as a shield against majority threats due to greater apprehension on their part and are more likely to retain power while leaders from the largest ethnic groups are more likely to lose power. Their conjecture, however, that ethnic majorities may enjoy enough confidence of political control to risk intraethnic succession, while minorities dare not risk a change in individual leaders, does not bear out in Rwanda where intraethnic succession occurred by force, or in Burundi which experimented with interethnic power-sharing in 1993, 1998, and 2003.

Thus, while a dominant minority is likely to be more apprehensive of its fate than a dominated minority, a dominated majority is likely to be more restive than a dominant majority. In short, both the minority and majority are likely to be more intolerant, fearful, and threatened under minority rather than majority rule, which suggests that group size and group advantage interact to influence group learning in important and unexpected ways.

By analyzing how trajectories of ethnic domination emerge and evolve, this article provides one explanation why a majority was able to take control of the state from a dominant minority in Rwanda but unable to retain power in the long run, and why a dominant minority in neighboring Burundi was not dislodged from power by the dominated majority.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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NOTES


2. A dyad characterized by “transnational ethnic ties” consists of contiguous states that are each host to members from two (or more) rival ethnic groups—that is, if two ethnic groups $a$ and $b$ exist then Country 1 contains members of both groups, as does adjacent Country 2. The proportion of $a$ and $b$ in each country may nonetheless vary. Group $a$ may be a majority in both countries, a minority in both countries, a majority (or have numerical parity) in one and a minority (or have numerical parity) in the other, or the groups may be equally distributed in both countries.


6. Ibid., 5.


9. Existing theoretical approaches address both the importance of transnational ethnic relations and the effect of minority rule on the incidence of civil violence. Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement,” International Organization 44(3): 351–77 (1990), lists the following assumptions to explain external involvement (or the lack thereof) in secessionist movements: normative regimes against involvement; neocolonialism; instrumentalism; cheap talk; diffusion; vulnerability; and realpolitik or security concerns. David Carment and Patrick James, “Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(1): 82–109 (1995), parse the early literature on the international dimensions of ethnic conflict into the following categories: conflict extension—how a specific conflict spreads to outside parties; interactive processes—the emergence of linkages between dissatisfied groups and the international system; and conflict transformation—the conversion of domestic strife to an interstate ethnic conflict.

More recent dyadic approaches, including Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18(4): 5–39 (1994), highlight ethnic demographics: group traits such as size and spatial dispersion affect the ease of rescue by ethnic brethren, the likelihood of discrimination by host governments, and the proclivity to pursue secessionism. As such, the likelihood of conflict is estimated to be higher if one state contains a minority at risk and the other integrates the minority into the power structure according to David Davis, Keith Jagers, and Will Moore, “Ethnicity, Minorities and International Conflict Patterns,” in David Carment and Patrick James, eds., The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 148–63;

Underscoring these findings, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44(3): 293–309 (2007), argues that the nature of transnational ties combined with the domestic attributes of states affect the incidence of civil war. And Lars-Erik Cederman, Luc Girardin, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Ethno-Nationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars,” *Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association* (Chicago 2007), and Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies,” *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 173–85 (2007), find that ethnic-kin have a discernable but conditional effect on likelihood of civil war in proportion to the excluded group’s relative demographic weight in the primary dyad; in addition Cederman et al. find that minority political dominance creates plurality group resentment and heightens perceptions of an opportunity to take power; an assertion contested by James Fearon, Kimuli Kasara, and David Laitin, “Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset,” *American Political Science Review* 101(1): 187–93 (2007), who find that while ethnic minority rule translates to between a 34% to 44% increase in likelihood of civil war, these estimates remain “fragile,” particularly in the African context, and rare if significant elsewhere.


14. Lemarchand notes that Burundi’s Tutsi elite initially had no intention to capture the state. Rather, accusations made by Burundi’s Hutu politicians of harboring these intentions culminated in a self-fulfilling prophecy: “[No other event did more to sharpen the edges of ethnic hatreds in Burundi than the Hutu revolution in neighboring Rwanda];” Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, 60.


18. Adekanye (1996) and Prunier (1995) recognize at least two important differences in the Hutu and Tutsi refugee communities. First, Adekanye rightly notes that the majority of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda were concentrated in Burundi where they faced few restrictions and enjoyed widespread state support; in contrast, Hutu refugees were more geographically dispersed (see Adekanye, “Rwanda/Burundi”). Second, Prunier suggests that Hutu refugees faced greater internal discord, as evidenced by disparate party affiliations and conflicting leadership cliques, than their Tutsi counterparts who were united in their aspiration to return to Rwanda. Unlike their Hutu counterparts, Prunier suggests that the Tutsi-led RPF was among the best-educated guerilla forces ever assembled (Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 93–126).


22. Ibid., 52.

23. Lemarchand (*Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* and “Managing Transition Anarchies”) argues that differences in status due to patrilineage (*imiryango*) and patron-client ties (*bugabire*) diminished the ability to explain Burundi’s complex social cleavages in terms of ethnicity alone.


30. Ibid., 666.


32. Ibid., 66.

33. Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power,” 257

34. Lemarchand’s remark that “never before had the Hutu as a group been so thoroughly reduced to the status of an underclass” is telling; Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, 103. Though often overshadowed by the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the 1972 genocide in Burundi was perpetrated by the Tutsi regime against the Hutu majority. See Lemarchand for more detail on methods used by the Tutsi minority in Burundi to suppress the Hutu majority including genocidal violence, purging the Hutu from the military and civil service, and instituting Kirundi as the sole medium of instruction in schools; Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*.

35. Ibid.

36. Prunier notes that while Rwanda’s Second Republic excluded Tutsi from many positions of power, from the military, and from higher education and civil service posts (*Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 86), life for most Tutsi, already “quite tolerable,” improved significantly under the Habyarimana regime (Ibid., 76). Along similar lines, Chretien observes that Tutsi enrollment in schools, universities, and the civil service was over 9%; three of Rwanda’s eight bishops were Tutsi; and private Tutsi businesses continued to fare well. See Jeanne-Pierre Chretien “Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi” [The Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi], in Jean-Loup Amselle and Elikia M’Bokolo, eds., *Au coeur de Vethnie:*


39. One could alternatively argue that if animosity is low, only a major threat will evoke any reaction on the part of group members. However, this formulation is not consistent with our reading of “low animosity” that suggests a more restrained reaction to “major” provocations.

40. Survey results from a study conducted by Garth Massey, Randy Hodson, and Duško Sekulic indicate that majority group members living in enclaves dominated by a minority group are more intolerant than in any other situation, whereas minority tolerance is high in ethnically mixed and majority-dominated areas, and lowest in minority-dominated areas; Garth Massey, Randy Hodson, and Duško Sekulic, “Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance: The Case of Yugoslavia,” Social Forces 78(2): 669–93 (1999).

41. In particular, it appears that the difference in aggregate strength in both countries is initially smaller than $\varepsilon$, leading to a struggle for domination that favors the minority whose aggregate strength increases at a faster rate than that of the majority when in power.


43. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 74.

44. See also Prunier, Burundi: A Manageable Crisis, 9–12.

45. Beyond Event 1,000 when Group $b$ unambiguously dominates Group $a$ in Country 2, $b$’s animosity falls and remains steady at 0.4 while $a$’s animosity rises and remains steady at 0.8; once Group $b$ unambiguously dominates $a$ in Country 1, the same pattern is replicated.

46. Extending the duration of the model to 3,000 events for all the remaining cases tested in this article had no effect on patterns of domination in Experiment 1, whereas in Experiment 2 this change reinforces the patterns of domination for Cases 3–7. In Experiment 3, extending the length of the run results in minority domination in both countries for Cases 1–5 (between Events 2,000 and 2,500) and reinforces patterns of domination for Cases 6–7. For Experiment 4, extending the length of the run had no effect on patterns of domination for Cases 1–5, whereas the effect for Case 6 is similar to that reported for Case 7 in Figure 3.


54. Lemarchand, Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 141.


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